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The diversity of pension trustees is increasing internationally (Rafferty et al 2008). In the UK, composition of pension boards is regulated by the UK Pension Act 2004. This Act stipulated that board composition requires at least a third of trustees to be elected representatives, who must be elected from the pension plan’s membership. The Act also raised the standards of knowledge and this has helped to legitimise expertise on pension boards and improve performance (Mellish, 2006). Improving transparency in pension board’s decision-making through greater member representation is also considered to help address the perceived shortfall in pension plan’s democratic practices (Clark, 2007). A review of the corporate governance and diversity literature (Carter et al 2003, McPhail 2010, Author B, 2009) suggests that diversity may bring about change. It is the shift in pension board composition towards members that was the impetus in our investigation of what being a trustee means and its implication for change on pension boards.
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus was chosen to explore the agency of trustees in boardroom activities, in order to explain how greater diversity among trustees can influence the decision-making process.  The notion of habitus emphasises the influential nature of individual’s past life and work experiences in shaping their ways of seeing and interpreting the world. Habitus as a concept can help us understand the reproduction of  masculine cultures that underpin dominant managerial elite groupings in corporate boardrooms (Bourdieu 2002; 27, Maclean et al 2010).  We operationalize the concept of habitus in order to help us interpret continuity and change in the trustees experiences of boardroom contexts where the habitus of privilege is enacted through acts of domination in the boardroom. We also explore how habitus and change can include trustee resistance, assimilation and finally reproduction in respect of a continuation of a dominant masculine corporate elite structure in pension boardrooms. 
Habitus, diversity and change are the thread uniting the themes around which the article is structured. First, in the empirical section we explore the tension between different perspectives of pension trustees’ functions and knowledge, and how this can be at odds with member representative viewpoints. Second, we consider how this tension is negotiated linking the discussion to boardroom solidarity and the ability of male and female trustees to be able to resist, assimilate or change the power dynamics of pension boards. Third, we indicate the potential influence for change of elected representatives on pension boardroom habitus.
The importance of pension boards to business enterprises shifted in the 1990s when executive boards realised that in monetary terms they were effectively running two businesses, their traditional enterprise and another about assurance, in effect their companies’ pension fund  (Blake 2003).  Thus, this level of decision-making, while highly regulated, also reveals continuity in elite groupings in a corporate UK boardroom context as enterprises recognise the importance of their occupational pension plans. In addition, Hymans Robertson’s research (2007) questioned the greyness of pension boards, the dominance of white ageing men in pension trusteeship. This is a persistent feature of corporate boards according to Maclean, et al.’s (2010) research, which highlights the generative nature of the reproduction of corporate managerial elites. How the dominant managerial culture helps to reproduce educational, corporate and social values on boards in its own image. We illustrate that greater diversity in this boardroom context has the potential for change. However, this is likely to be slow and incremental in the short term because of the persistence and dominance of the existing managerial power elite and their ability to resist or assimilate change agents. 

Habitus, Diversity and Change
Roberson (2006) indicates how definitions of diversity have expanded to include both observable and non-observable characteristics. Kandola and Fullerton’s (1994) diversity definition too encompasses a broader notion of diversity that includes background and experience as well as class, race and gender. Diversity in these expanded terms is also examined in the governance and diversity literature (Carter, et al 2003, Erhardt, et al, 2003,Van der Walt, and Ingley, 2003, Author B). This literature outlines how diversity can provoke change in boardroom governance and decision-making by promoting a better understanding of the stakeholders and how diversity may introduce more creativity and innovation and produce more effective problem-solving by enhancing the effectiveness of corporate leadership (Adams, and Ferrira, 2009). Thus diversity has positive implications for boards’ effective stewardship and corporate performance (Carver 2002). More recent research in the US has focused on the mixed gender composition of boards and outlined how this is positively related to board effectiveness (Mckinsey, 2007) although the degree of this impact is debated (Mcphail, 2010, Rose, 2007). This debate reinforces notions that gender (as a category of diversity and in particular women’s participation) is an indicator of change. But we argue that the ability of an elite grouping to exclude people with different status, class, gender, ethnicity, educational or work backgrounds (Scott 2008:34) is also an important aspect of diversity and thus has major relevance for our discussion of diversity and change. 
This article’s definition of an elite group is linked to the ability of an executive grouping to be able to ‘exercise authoritative or allocative domination over others’, or put more simply to exercise power over others (Scott, 2008: 35). Another critical component of the definition of an elite group is that it includes the ability to ‘command the resources’ of the organisation for which they take ultimate responsibility (Maclean, et al 2010:330, Scott 2008: 34). Traditionally UK boardrooms are the domain of powerful white male managerial executives (Neilson, and Huse, 2010). The influence of this type of continuity in boardroom culture according to Hyman Robertson’s research (2007) seems to have to be exported to the pension boardroom in relation to the managerial composition of corporate elites (Kakabadse, andKakabadse, 2005). So how can we explain the reproduction of practice, of managerial orthodoxy where managerial hierarchies are associated with men and masculinity, where women (and men) who do not adopt a dominant managerial masculinity are assigned a position as a marginal or ‘other’ (Kerfoot and Knights, 1998:7). 
Here Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and agency is used to explain continuity and change in trustee’s situational understanding of their more diverse boards where material and symbolic power interact to structure and reproduce their experience. Fuchs (2003:6 cited in Morrison, 2005) considers that habitus explains the circularity of causality of how agency affects structure and structure affects agency, how small causes can have large effects and vice versa. How is diversity affecting pension trusteeship? Are trustees from backgrounds which are different to the dominant group changing what happens in the boardroom when they engage in the process of decision-making or are they being changed by it? 
The homogeneity of boardrooms elite helps to reinforce the solidarity of an elite grouping and their exercise of power in the boardroom. However the advent of more diverse entrants has the potential to disrupt this boardroom solidarity. This includes not just women but also people from different class and status backgrounds, who have different access to power resources. For Bourdieu (1986) power is perceived as being derived from capital and capital is termed in four ways: economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Economic capital appears above all, in the form of general, anonymous, all purpose convertible money from one generation to the next (Author B). It can be seen more easily and efficiently converted into cultural, social and symbolic capital because as a commodity it can be traded for other capital to enhance power. Social capital is the social interaction and relationship development that dynamically evolve through social connections in a group or class membership. Davis et al (2003 cited in Clegg, 2006) point out that a feature of UK corporate boardrooms is the inter-connected nature of the corporate elite. They highlight how the distance between directors comprises of a small chain whereby they might not know the other but in their network they will have people in common reinforcing their legitimacy to participate.  Thus social networks can underpin the legitimacy of candidature for entry to the elite (Scott 2008), an outcome of which is that blue collar workers, women and ethnic minorities may find it difficult to accrue the social capital to utilise social networks and membership to obtain the necessary standing to permit entry to executive boardrooms or influence activities if they do gain entry.   
Cultural capital too can legitimise social differences through the production of knowledge. The ascribed and accumulated wealth of durable dispositions of habitus; becoming objectivised ideologies through cultural functions e.g. books, technology etc., which in turn are then institutionalised and given academic and professional recognition through credentialism such as degrees and technical qualifications. (Mayrhofer, et al., 2004: 3-4). This then becomes an objectified intergenerational power resource that is embodied from childhood. Childhood is where we learn to interact with others and establish a sense of identity and belonging. Cultural capital allows us to discuss the importance of inherited dispositions and the significance of personal aspects such as family, education and work experience.  All of these aspects sensitise individuals to cultural differences to a point that men’s domination of corporate elites appears natural and right thus perpetuating continuity of a dominant masculine elite in the boardroom (Bourdieu and Warquant, 1992, Author A, Swartz, 1997). 
Symbolic capital is a product of economic, social and cultural capital. It is legitimised by the rules of the social field it occupies. For Bourdieu all symbolic systems are rooted in domination with dominant groupings working to establish and maintain social structures and status distinctions. Symbolic power is an invisible power in which people are complicit in not recognising that they are subject to it or even that they themselves use it.  Power rests in how it is unconsciously acknowledged both internally and externally in situational understandings of the world, (the habitus). How it is used to structure interactions and is itself reproduced by daily interactions (Bourdieu 1990, Maclean et al., 2010). This theorising has significance for boardroom activity, which sits at the apex of power within organisational settings. Just as ‘the corporate office is the habitat of the powerful’, (Corsun & Costen, 2001:19) it could be argued that this is replicated in pension board activities which are dominated by a similar group of men. So while increasing diversity may instigate change, people from different backgrounds may find themselves confronted by an elite grouping whose unity and cohesion of consciousness and action is such that their values, attitudes and beliefs are united into symbolic capital and outsiders feel less able to influence and change the boardroom and instead begin to be assimilated or opt out (Ragins, 1995:97).
For Bourdieu, habitus is a system of dispositions, that is ‘manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking, or a schemes or structure of perception, conception and action, or a system of long-lasting (rather than permanent) schemes or schemata or structures of perception thinking, feeling, evaluating, speaking’ that informs all the expressive verbal, practical manifestations and utterances of an actor (Bourdieu, 2002:27). Bourdieu viewed society as a perpetual continuum of changing social habitus, where people without the necessary habitus to maintain this evolution would be marginalised (Bourdieu, 1985). This marginalisation is explained by how the socio-structural nature of habitus encourages a vision of a society, committed to a continual process of ‘deconstructing and reconstructing consciousness which competitively aspire to secure collective authority’ (Robbins 2005:19, 25). A collective authority can be used to reinforce solidarity and continuity in boardroom dynamics.
Mutch (2003) considers that applying habitus as a mode of analysis is problematic because of the circularity of Bourdieu’s concept, which explains social practices by the effects they produce. He claims that Bourdieu work is useful to explain reproduction but less able to explain change (Mutch, 2003:390) because it suggests a degree of determinism and fatalism within the internalisation of habitus which suggests that actors are reducible to social structure (Archer, 2000 cited in Elder-Vass, 2007:332). Mutch and Elder-Vass are not alone in highlighting the deterministic nature of Bourdieu’s theory (see Jenkins, 1992). However, their reading remains partial as Bourdieu, as a political activist, intended habitus to be regarded as a generative structure that demands invention and improvisation in order for individuals to negotiate rules of the field (in this case the boardroom). Thus there is agency in responding to events within the field (Sweetman, 2003; McNay, 1999) such as a global crisis in economic stewardship and governance (McPhail 2010).  
Bourdieu often used the concept of a game to help explain dispositional habitus. There are many games to which women, minorities and blue collar workers are unwelcome ‘not because they lack the necessary capabilities but for want of entitlement to play’ (Lovell, 2000: 12). This metaphor of dispositional habitus is developed further by Corsun and Costen (2001) who consider how future experiences are influenced by our past experience and how the field of play is not one on which norms and boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are indelibly painted. ‘Rather, as the players in the field constantly renegotiate them, it is more appropriate to think of the lines as imaginary vectors connecting the positions of the most peripheral players. As players move about, enter or exit the field, the boundaries may change’, (Corsun and Costen, 2001:18). So there is an element of change as well as a process of continuity contained within a Bourdieu analysis, which is linked to how norms about corporate elites are challenged, reformed and revised. 

Pension Trusteeship in Context
Pension trustees manage billion pound investment funds. They negotiate with corporate sponsors over funding of occupational pension plans on behalf of the membership. Thus their elite profile is increasing as they are seen as increasingly powerful figures controlling major financial resources within the business community.  While their boardroom profile might have changed there is continuity in function. They still remain a group of people who collectively and individually act as a board to ensure that a pension scheme is run honestly and prudently in the best interest of the scheme’s members (Blake, 2003). These fiduciary duties over-ride all other aspects of trusteeship. 
However, the responsibilities of pension scheme trustees are significant as the pension regulator indicates (www.pensionsregulator.gov.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.pensionsregulator.gov.uk​)). All appointed, elected or independent trustees are personally and collectively liable for losses from any breach of duty or misuse of scheme assets. They also have to recognise the importance of the employer’s covenant and be aware of tensions invoked by the inherent conflict of interest between members and employers/sponsors, which can be linked to their official work role e.g. financial executive. A major element of their role is to challenge the decision-making process of the scheme and ensure that decisions are made openly and impartially (Clark, 2007).  Since 2004 the composition of UK pension boards has to include at least a third of elected trustees thus changing the diversity of pension boards to include more people from different occupational backgrounds. Thereby challenging the traditional managerial masculine solidarity of boards and offering the possibility for change. 
The reasons for becoming a trustee reflect how trustees may be appointed by the employer or elected by the membership. A major reason includes doing the role as part of their job, for instance a financial executive of the sponsor company will be appointed to represent the employers. Another motivation for doing the role may be someone who worked in pension administration and is invited to join or may choose to represent the membership through being elected to the role (Author A, 2009). But underpinning this decision is an element of social commitment for taking on a mainly unpaid but powerful role. This is connected to how trusteeship is perceived by the trustees as a decision-making role, which also has a high level of legal and moral responsibility, which reflects continuity in function and regulation (Kakabadse, et al., 2003).  
Boardrooms are organisationally the fulcrums of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). Pension boards are similar in that appointed trustees are usually high-ranking employees chosen by the employer from HR and finance.  Appointed trustees tend to come more from an economic/legal background, which is considered to help them negotiate the complex economic and social actions invoked by trusteeship (Kakabadse et al., 2003). Meanwhile independent trustees are often selected by employers to make sure that the pension board activities are complying with regulatory and good pension practice. Independents tend to come from a managerial background and regularly chair the board. 
The election of member’s representatives has the potential to disrupt the uniformity of pension board composition around corporate elites as trustees come from more diverse occupational backgrounds. It is in evaluating how this increased diversity is viewed and experienced within a boardroom environment that traditionally has been considered to be the ‘fraternity of the successful’ (Mills, 1956:281 cited in Maclean, et al., 2010) that is the major contribution of this paper. This discussion also has relevance for the current debate about the lack of diversity on corporate boards and the slow pace of change, particularly in relation to women (Neilson and Huse, 2010, Davies Report, 2011). However, Roberson (2006) considers that an exclusive focus on only women shifts attention from how people from different backgrounds may also be excluded from the homogeneous corporate elite. This situation also holds true for people who are elected directly from the membership and come from different educational and work backgrounds and as in labour representatives different social networks. 
The complex economic and social actions invoked by trusteeship of a pension scheme are negotiated within an executive boardroom context and are a challenge for all pension trustees in different ways. The role is a highly scrutinised one as is made clear (www.pensionsregulator.gov.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.pensionsregulator.gov.uk​)). But being a pension trustee has become a more challenging and important role as demographics change, markets become more turbulent, and as economic pressures on employers increase (Gribben and Gitsham, 2006). The high-status role of pension trustee is made more exacting by appointed, independent and elected trustees having to negotiate the increasing regulation of pension governance that stresses functional competence and integrity in investing funds and acting on behalf of the member (Clark, 2007). Thus they have to have to balance function with representation, which means reconciling the political interests of the many stakeholders in pension schemes including the elected representatives (Weststar and Verma, 2007). 
There is a scarcity of literature on trusteeship and diversity despite evidence that diversity in pension trusteeship globally is increasing (Rafferty et al., 2008). The experience of both appointed and elected trustees is needed to understand how diversity is interpreted and what this means for boardroom continuity and change. Hymans Robertson’s research indicates that the pension board demograph is similar to the traditional managerial profile of boardrooms, a white, ageing male corporate elite.  In the UK, women make up 18% of pension trustees and 3% of the trustees are from minority ethnic groups (Hymans Robertson, 2007). The continuing dominance of white, ageing men at this level suggests that the corporate managerial model remains unchanged (Bradley, 2007; Maclean et al., 2010). So considering this from a trustee perspective gives us an insight into continuity as well as changes in managerial orthodoxy of the pension boardroom. 
Methods
Pension trustees are a very difficult to reach population for fine grained research. They are geographically spread. They also have busy agendas and have limited time for interviews. Furthermore, researching diversity issues, due to their critical and sensitive issues are harder than researching aspects of trusteeship which are in line with the dominant ideologies of the corporate elites. Diversity remains the locked box of corporate practices due to the critical tone of recent public policy and academic interest on this topic. A snow ball technique was used, mobilising contacts of a former executive of the National Association of Pension Funds, a TUC pension officer and a senior figure in the pension industry, who allowed us access because they were concerned about the lack of research into what it meant to be a pension trustee. This rationale underpinned the interview questions, which prioritised how trustees personally interpreted the role, how they dealt with the responsibility and on-going challenges of the role, how they interpreted diversity and how this influenced decision-making dynamics.  Personal introductions were used to get access to the original first six interviewees and the other nine interviewees self selected through email contact. Discussions about the drawing of a sample of pension trustees to be interviewed were limited by a consideration of practical constraints, such as geographical location, all trustees were located in the south of England. There is also a self-selection bias. The key concepts identified for sampling were; experience before and after 2004 regulation, sector public/private, gender and including a cross-section of elected, appointed and independent trustees. Interviews lasted on average 90 minutes and all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Themes used to analyse the interviews were; diversity and participation, role motivation, work and pension experience and capability, engagement in board activities. 
[Table 1 Here] 
The research profile is representative of the diversity of pension boards as a whole in age and occupational background. One area where it differs is in the ratio of men to women, women on pension boards only make up 18% of pension trustees in the UK (Hymans Robertson, 2007). But in all other respects the women chosen fulfilled the criteria in terms of variety of experience, age and occupational backgrounds including trade union representation. In our profile elected representatives come from a broader range of occupations, data processing, engineering and a scientist, than the more economist/legal background of appointed trustees (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2005). This may be linked to the implementation of legislation in 2004. 

Research Findings
All the trustees participating in this research interpreted diversity very broadly, going beyond demographic features to include people with different skills, work experiences and backgrounds as well as social categorisation. This trustee interpretation of diversity categories resonates with Kandola and Fullerton’s definition of diversity, which includes ‘visible and non-visible differences’ as well as factors such as, ‘sex, age, background, race, disability personality and work style (1994:8). While we have adopted this broad definition ex-post we are not taking this term uncritically, but consider that all aspects of diversity are part and parcel of the system of domination on pension boards (Roberson 2006). Thereby a broader definition of diversity is needed to fully understand the trustee’s experience of boardroom habitus.
All trustees reported that they welcome diversity on their pension boards and there was evidence that increased diversity was resulting in trustees being more reflective about their role and their experience of being a trustee. However, a trustee role is a challenging one and there is a subjective element in how individuals and boards interpret capability and merit in respect of boardroom participation that resonates through the research. This subjectivity may have implications for change on pension boards as it can be interpreted by powerful others in different ways (Malleson, 2003). Nevertheless the findings also outline that how trustees perceive diversity is challenging the assumptions of the existing pension board. It is positively influencing their board’s decision-making process in some contexts. But disrupting the solidarity of existing pension boards consciousness is more of an on going project for others. 

Tension Between Pension Trustees’ Perspectives of Appropriate Knowledge (Function) and Representatives’ Knowledge
The Myners Report 2001 suggested raising the standard of care provided by pension trustees and this was enacted in the Pensions Act 2004. The pension regulator makes clear that trustees ‘must have appropriate knowledge and understanding of the law relating to pensions and trusts, the principles relating to the funding of occupational defined benefit pension schemes and the investment of the assets of such schemes’, (www.pensionsregulator.co.uk (​http:​/​​/​www.pensionsregulator.co.uk​)) as well as be conscientious, impartial and committed trustees who place the interests of the members first. The Pension Regulator does not specify particular skills and competences because of the diverse nature of pension plans in place, their different plan rules, sizes, scope and maturity. This places in tension two critical but contradictory elements of pension governance, appropriate knowledge (pensions plan functions) and representative knowledge, (ensuring that member’s interests are considered).  It is how this tension is interpreted and negotiated that is of interest here.
The first aspect that the trustees discussed in relation to diversity and change was the connection between participants’ occupation and function on pension boards. For example:
Diversity is an important part. You don’t want a committee of people like me from the legal side who wouldn’t know what they were doing with an investment. This is why we have people on the committee who are specialists but they’ve all got to have that standard knowledge. (Pension trustee 5)
Standard knowledge is a key point raised by the trustees and recognises the demands of the regulator about trustee knowledge and capabilities. One of the independent trustees considers this point in relation to diversity to argue that in pension trusteeship capability and qualification must come before demographic diversity for pension boards:
I’ve been on various organisations where you do try to get gender and ethnic balance in all these sort of things but where I come from is you’ve still got to get people who are capable of doing the job, and that has to come before these other things. OK if you can get these things as well, that’s great. But to start going for the right balance by filling it with people who are not capable or qualified to do the job seems to me to be a backward step.  (Pension trustee 10) 
However, the literature review outlines how interpretations of capability and qualification maybe tempered in accordance with individuals’ own cultural and social capital. Bourdieu’s recognised how the field of practice, (the boardroom) has to be linked to an acknowledgement of power resources and the construction of the field and the habitus that players bring to that field (Swartz, 1997: 143, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). This does not mean that we can interrogate the above statement about capability as we lack further information about the individual’s cultural and social capital. But it does raise a question about what knowledge is prioritised in pension trusteeship? Certainly, the subjectivity suggested by terms such as capability, standard and appropriate knowledge leaves the majority of the trustees interviewed grappling with the issue of appropriate knowledge in connection to managing pension funds.  This is a dilemma for inexperienced board members (including both elected and appointed trustees), who are less confident about boardroom entry: 
We need more members to participate to form 30% (elected reps) and then we are burdening them with an individual level of knowledge that even we never expect to reach en bloc. We have to rely on the collective board to say we have got a sensible process. (Pension trustee 12) 
The above quote stresses the collective nature of boards, which make new entrants dependent on others for how knowledge is interpreted as they enter the boardroom. How the individual knowledge of new entrants is interpreted will also influence their degree of participation. For example, if you’re good with detail you may be allocated to the admin committee, if you have experience with finance allocation to the investment committee. The trustees argue that what boards require is a balance between people coming from the traditional financial side, the financial director and the people side such as HR. This viewpoint supports the arguments put forward for diversity in corporate governance (Carter, et al., 2003). It also means finding a balance between the varied functions of a trustee role dealing with individual’s pension benefits, administration and management as well as investment issues.  Unfortunately this creates tension with the regulator’s insistence that individual trustees need ‘to be up to speed on everything’ (Pension trustee 8) within a six months timeframe. The Pension regulator makes no specific recommendation on skills and competence but does insist that all trustees reach a certain level within six months. The regulator facilitates training through its pension ‘toolkit’, which is accessible to all by computer. Boards also support other training and the TUC is active in supporting and educating labour and mumber nominated trustees:
It is a bit like a company board. It is about having a balance of skills so that you get good governance. I’m an accountant I don’t think you want six accountants but it might good to have a lawyer and someone with investment expertise and so on so you’ve got different disciplines represented but I think they’ve got to have sufficient intellect to understand some very complex issues. We’ve just undertaken, some trustee training my goodness you would struggle if you did not have some sort of commercial background. (Pension trustee 10)
For the above individual the meaning of skills and commercial background would be shaped in part by his experiences of working within an accredited profession. Professions often develop their own terminology, which can be another form of domination. So what these subjective terms of capability, knowledge and commercial background actually mean for people on boards who do not share similar levels of cultural and social capital and prioritize a representational perspective is not clear. Pension trusteeship on pension boards can reflect aspects of corporate boards such as sharing similar business occupational characteristics, qualifications or coming from particular professional disciplines, a similar level of capital. The deconstruction and reconstruction of consciousness (Robbins, 2005) to incorporate professional experience or commercial knowledge that is similar to present incumbents can help to secure board’s collective authority. The problem then is that this social order can be reinforced by dominant others’ differing interpretations of subjective terms such as ‘commercial background’ into something they are familiar with such as professional skills and seniority. 
Pension trustee 2 considers the above point about skills and commercial background and claims that her quantitative background as a data processor ably equipped her to function in the trustee role as did her knowledge of pension administration. She did not feel marginalised in terms of capability and knowledge but in seniority:
I thought pension trusteeship needed a female voice. I really don’t know why it was so biased to men considering that there were a large proportion of women within our organisation... I find the world of pension funds quite masculine. I find it quite strange that obviously being so close to the pension administration team when they were in-house, the administrators tended to be women and yet when you look at the board they are men. It may say something about power and status (Pension trustee 2).  
The above trustee worked alongside many female colleagues in pension administration.  The major motivation for involvement for Pension trustee 2 was representation. She considered that her female colleagues had trustee capability and could have represented their predominantly female membership. Thus in her explanation for the lack of female participation she explicitly linked this to the lack of women on the board and their lower levels of status and power within the company rather than their functional skill or knowledge. 
The problem for discussions of diversity and change is that if seniority is the yardstick by which people judge themselves and one another, if a women perceives herself as an unequal board member because of this yardstick (Nielson and Huse, 2010: 19) then there is a risk that women do not put themselves forward for this boardroom role despite having the functional knowledge and capability to do the role unless they have other capital to call upon.  For example, women and men may be reluctant to put themselves up for election even if they have the necessary skills because they lack confidence to participate in executive decision-making. Involvement in other social networking routes such as trade unions or professional bodies such as the National Association of Pension Funds can help people to self-identify as a potential participant thereby increasing the talent pool of trustees widening recruitment beyond the regular pattern of elite association and recruitment (Scott, 2008).

Diversity and Change:  Masculinity, privilege and pension boards
 The previous section about interpretation of function and representation highlights potential areas of possible resistance. It outlines how the need to assimilate with existing power dynamics may thwart change on pension boards. An important component of these power dynamics are gender and masculine privilege in the creation of dispositional habitus in the boardroom (Bourdieu, 2002, Nielson and Huse, 2010, Maclean, et al., 2010). Pension trustee 2 indicates the lack of gender diversity on her pension board despite the predominance of female members. 
However, Pension trustee 4 chairs a public sector pension scheme of a male-dominated sector and thus because of the nature of the industry she was not surprised to be the only female board member. Several of the male trustees agreed that the dominance of men was a reflection of the male/female composition of their particular sector and organisation and was thus ‘natural’. However, pension trustee 4 also saw gender and diversity as a benefit because in her long experience of pension boards it was dominated by very similar ‘middle-aged grey-suited males, which I think is a pity’. One of the independent trustees considers this point in electing male and female trustees and indicates characteristics of a privileged masculinity within ‘the City’ which for him had historically valued drive and ambition in the dominant culture of masculinity: 
I have been in the city all my life there has always been a small minority of women at that level there was a shortage of candidates who were ambitious and driven to succeed in the way ‘the City’ demands and that has changed over the last 20 years and the numbers are starting to come through. I would like to think that they try to decide when people see a ballot paper that they vote for the best candidate. But I am not that naïve and there can be an element of men voting for men and vice versa and it will be a while before we break that down. The sensible thing is to appoint the best candidate for the job, professional orientation is irrelevant (Pension trustee 8).
Professional orientation may be irrelevant for this experienced trustee. But could it be that the androcentric nature of ‘the City’, the financial heartland of corporate UK, acts as a symbolic vehicle to reinforce the masculine domination (Bourdieu, 2001: 9) of the ‘City of London’? The UK government’s concern with the lack of women on corporate boards in the private sector may support this interpretation (Davies Report, 2011). However, a trustee located in the public sector and in a different industry has had a different experience in relation to boardroom masculine domination.
Pension Trustee 1 worked for a media-related public sector organisation. The last chief executive had been a woman and usually out of six directors one or two were women. She argued that her organisation was used to seeing women in senior positions and this was matched in pension board appointments.  The above highlights how different organisations in different sectors may have different traditions and heritage in relation to the symbolic dominance of men in the boardroom. More women at board level may influence the dispositional habitus of what is considered to be acceptable behaviour in boardroom culture to a point where it is less about masculinity and privilege and more about managerial privilege. 
The need to explore different contexts about masculinity, diversity and change is made clear by quotations from another female trustee, who argued that it was important that masculine privilege should be challenged: 
I think the people on the pension board had settled into a bit of a rut, people had done it for quite a while.  They weren’t questioning they were making assumptions. I think it was a bit a job ‘for the boys’….It is a masculine environment. It is quite daunting.  But I was quite confident in that environment because I had also been appointed as director of a subsidiary company board that was also very male dominated. But I got used to that and I had to sit in on Board meetings every month to present the people side, although I wasn’t a board member. (Pension trustee 3)
Pension trustee 3 is a HR Director and an appointed trustee. She was reflexive about the trustee role, as a female outsider entering a boardroom and pension boardroom, which she perceived to be synonymous with masculine privilege. She used her dispositional knowledge of masculine power dynamics to help diffuse her discomfort when acting at a boardroom level. She took comfort from the fact that she was familiar with this type of ‘masculine’ boardroom activity and that she was studying for an MBA. This improved her knowledge of finance and gave her more confidence in challenging the board about investment issues.  This increase in cultural capital was indispensable in her challenging the existing behaviour of the board but it was not sufficient on its own to combat assimilation in accepting masculine privilege.
For pension trustee 3 the key factor that changed the dynamics of her board’s governance and helped her to resist assimilation was the entry of a new group of elected and appointed representatives including another woman.  This group of newcomers recognised that they were ‘outsiders’ according to pension trustee 3 because of their gender and non-managerial work backgrounds. Together they pooled their experiences and used their joint resources to challenge the long-standing institutional relationships and discussions that shaped the board structure and activities around masculine corporate privilege.  Then they appreciated that:
 ‘questioning others on the board about their decision-making process, the assumptions on which that process was based was what trusteeship meant’.(Pension trustee 3)   
If habitus is a system of dispositions ‘of permanent manners of being, seeing, acting and thinking’ (Bourdieu, 2002:27) then the above indicates how new people on pension boards can disrupt an overly ‘cosy’ masculine unity between individuals with similar values, attitudes and experience. How the different past experiences of these newcomers to the board are embodied in their social agency, which provided them with a different system of perception and recognition upon which to act in a boardroom context and that allowed them to question a decision-making process formulated around masculine corporate privilege. For the HR director the previous trustees appear to be a product of the structural constraints of thinking ‘jobs for the boys’. She suggests that this culture of masculinity privilege was one they felt comfortable with and predisposed their reaction in trustee matters.   New regulations supported the entry of new people to the board, thereby potentially changing the practices of the boardroom field (Sweetman, 2003).  Here the entry of new elected less privileged trustees meant the new entrants were able to combine their different cultural and social capital and reflect on their role and their participation. Thus instead of assimilating they began to challenge and alter the dispositional habitus and ultimately the symbolic capital of a pension board elite grouping to participate fully in influencing board decision-making. 

Diversity and Elected Representatives 
In this section we examine more closely the experience of elected representatives [including elected labour representatives] their habitus, diversity and change. Once again the subjectivity of language used to discuss intellectual capacity of trusteeship reappears. But on the whole trustees who had been doing the role prior to 2004 considered that the new elected trustees were often better than appointed trustees. They were more committed and knowledgeable about the extent of the role particularly about governance. Indeed the majority of trustees considered there was not a problem with elected trustees’ intellectual capacity on their board despite one trustee’s concern: 
It was more you had to twist people’s arms to stand and you need to persuade the right sort of people, who could get to grips with the issues… I suppose that is better than nothing but not quite as good as having a process where there is an election with lots of candidates. It could be positively dangerous if you had people who were unsophisticated, who did get elected by default. They’ve got to have the expertise, the training, the intellect necessary to be able to understand the complex issues involved. But in smaller funds it is much more difficult to get lots of candidates (Pension trustee 10). 
The difficulty that smaller schemes face in finding trustee candidates is a recognised problem (Mellish, 2006). But what is meant by the use of unsophisticated candidates is unclear although in the above trustee’s plan most members were from professional backgrounds. Thus board representatives were usually professionals so some shared sensibility around professional interpretations may be part of their plan’s particular system of dominance and assimilation. But why boards require a broader version of occupational and material diversity than just professional diversity in their composition is answered below:
 We have a female investment officer, a lawyer, the ex UK finance director plus two actuaries, a reasonable split of skills and standing as well as representatives from different walks of life,  I think that is extremely valuable. For example, the Finance director made comments about the DC scheme that the cost of living index has only gone up by 2% max.  He was essentially saying if you want more than that you can pay for it out of your salary.  Most of the people around that table were saying OK that’s fine. It is, if you’re on 150K a year, you’ve got that level of choice. For him that was the natural honest answer, that is what he would do. But for a machine operator- perhaps only taking home 25k a year- it is a big decision to pay more to insure himself against the cost of living going up when he retires (Pension trustee 11).
For this elected labour participant diversity is more about occupational difference than demographic diversity and this is linked to how material and symbolic power interact in the boardroom (Fuchs, 2003:6 cited in Morrison, 2005). Greater representation adds a new dimension to trusteeship decision-making. However, there may be an increase in tension after new employee trustee representatives are elected as they challenge the existing board room dispositional habitus. But the importance of disrupting existing settled relationships and avoiding the reproduction of an elite consciousness where trustees share similar environmental and positional dispositions that leads to a commonality of action (Scott, 2008) in membership economic decisions is outlined above. The following quote evidences this too:
 I think groupthink (where the group thinks it is invincible and right) could be dangerous to a group of trustees. I was amongst a group of people who assumed that there was no real need to keep the members of the scheme briefed in detail. But when the scheme changed members were wanting more information and I suddenly realised we were wrong and that wasn’t made clear to me until two new elected members joined and argued forcibly that we were wrong in our thinking. That is an example of groupthink. There can be a de facto constituency dynamic there and that does tend to come out at meetings. The elected representatives are the ones to state it because we (the appointed) do not have any contact with the active members as such and it is useful (Pension trustee 9)
Here the pension trustee reflects on his experience subsequent to changes in diversity of the board. He changes his original more deterministic stance that the board collectively without consultation knew what was best for members. The doxic superiority of the board and the reproduction of managerial logic  (Bourdieu, 2001:9) has been challenged as the rules of the field change to include more membership representation (Sweetman, 2003).

Work Experience and Trusteeship  
The majority of new recruits to the pension board find the demands of the roles disorienting regardless of their background and habitus according to the experienced trustees.
You are very much reliant on the actuaries and appointed advisors, and there was a sense of vulnerability because were you being advised adequately? Because your responsibility for the scheme is ultimate, it is a very different experience to serving on ordinary professional practitioner committees. (Pension trustee 9)
For this pension trustee he thought he would have felt at home in the boardroom as a product of a socially constituted habitus [a director]. But this was not the case. However, pension trustee 2, our lower status data processor did not find the experience disorienting as she had worked alongside pension administration so was familiar with the content of discussions. 
For pension trustee 2 the problem was time constraints, specifically preparing for meetings. While time off for the meetings was not a problem she had to use her own time to prepare. This preparation can be onerous when it includes reading ‘six inches of paperwork’ before the meeting. When asked why she never discussed with her employer the possibility of negotiating more time to prepare for meetings she had no answer. This suggests that her dispositional habitus did not include having the experience of power and status to permit her to negotiate with management (Halford and Leonard, 2001). 
The different dispositional habitus of performing shift-work also needs to be recognised. How working with shift working colleagues created a different disposition, a sense of obligation to colleagues:
Having blue-collar representation in trusteeship is important. But working shifts are thinly spread. An area of friction is that while the factory manager will say ‘if you need to go then OK’, the guy who is managing the shift and shift pattern won’t have been consulted by a senior manager and now he has got a big headache because he’s got one person off sick and he’s got this guy who want to go to a trustee meeting and he has to cover for the shift (Pension trustee 11).
The above discussion indicates that there is an underlying class aspect to diversity, which has implications for power dynamics and change (Bradley, 2007).   Employers are often supportive of lower-status white-collar and blue-collar worker’s involvement in trusteeship.  However, subordinate workers do face different tensions that relate to their different social and cultural capital and learnt interactions with others.  Subordinate workers dispositional habitus means they do not have the expectation or power to organise their work schedules or make greater demands on employers for support (Bourdieu, and Warquant, 1992).  As a result they can feel guilty or resentful of their trustee participation as they try to squeeze their preparation for meetings into their leisure time or as their colleagues take on extra duties.
One of the independent trustees considered that individuals would be rewarded in the future probably with promotion or greater recognition for time spent preparing. But this is placing a different experience of a social order and different experiences of working in senior managerial roles, a different dispositional habitus, onto all trustees. While promotional aspirations is valid for some trustees, particularly appointed trustees (Kakabadese, et al., 2003). More diverse elected trustees who stand because they believe in representation may not aspire to promotion such as pension trustee 2 or for labour representatives, who want to represent their work colleagues. 
Conclusion 
This article set out to investigate change in the context of increased diversity among pension trustees. Regulatory changes to pension board composition have implications for a discussion of resistance and assimilation. The literature indicated that members of the board are symbols of masculine domination and privilege. However, the governance literature considers that diversity can improve the effectiveness of boardroom actions (Carter, et al., 2003, Carver, 2002) although the impact that diversity based on categories such as gender, race , class, educational and work experience background have on the solidarity and elite consciousness of boardroom elites is disputed (McPhail, 2010,  Rose, 2007).  
The findings indicated that in some contexts, particularly in the private sector, the advent of new trustees from a variety of different backgrounds may highlight the continuity of masculine domination rather then change. The entry of these new trustees to the field of pension trusteeship does permit some trustees to challenge the assumptions that underpin the continuity of masculine domination and instigate change.  Habitus was used as a conceptual tool to help us explore how the embodiment of past experiences and the traditional dispositional habitus of the executive boardroom can influence trustee’s participation in high level decision-making and their agency to influence boardroom changes (Author 2006).  This view has implications not only for female trustees, some of whom feel pressurised to accept and assimilate their behaviour to masculine norms of the boardroom (Bradley, 2007), but also has implications for elected and trade union representatives whose motivation for standing and their ideology prioritises a different viewpoint rooted in a different discourse of equality and social justice. 
Bourdieu outlines the maintenance of the social distinction of people can be subtly used to legitimate the involvement of a masculine elite. We explored this in the boardroom. Thus challenging the generative nature of this solidarity is an ongoing project for diversity and change. While changing the habitus of the pension boardroom is possible, it is not the end but the beginning of an ongoing project. The risk is that privileged elites can continue to utilise their greater material and social power to maintain the apparent legitimacy and ‘naturalness’ of the managerial masculine domination. This unity of consciousness and action (Scott, 2008) can result in the dominant masculine values, attitudes and beliefs creating symbolic capital to a point where the social categorisation and experiences of outsiders from different classes, gender, educational and work backgrounds  results in them feeling  less able to influence and change the boardroom and instead they begin to be assimilated or opt out (Ragins, 1995:97). Certainly the subjective nature of interpretations of capability, appropriate knowledge and even sophistication offer a route whereby the incumbent elite can re-assert their interpretation, in order to upgrade attributes and skills which are similar to their own (Malleson, 2003). Thereby suggesting that new entrants from backgrounds which are different to the norm may be forced to assimilate into rather than challenge the existing social order. 
The research findings also have implications for gender diversity and change in corporate boardrooms (Nielson and Huse, 2010, Vinnicombe et al., 2008). The Davies Report (2011), in the UK, stresses non-regulatory approaches to increase   women’s numbers in the boardroom. An analysis of diversity, habitus and change of this environment would suggest that voluntary moves would perpetuate the element of privilege and elite consciousness, through social and cultural processes of reproduction. Thus only women, who share similar levels of social and cultural capital to boardroom men, are likely to be recruited to the boardroom. The solidarity of cultural and social experiences is more likely to invoke acceptance and assimilation to pervading values and action rather than change on gendered nature of corporate boards. While at first sight, this change may be interpreted as a step towards more mixed gender diversity in the boardroom, failing to address nature of privilege in the boardroom, can leave many other forms of diversity and forms of exclusion and discrimination unexplored.
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